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tllr. chairman, I am honored to have the opportunlty to testifl
before your coffiulttee on the subject of "U.S.-European Economic
Relacions". My name is Richard D. Erb and I am a Resident Fe110w
at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.
I am restifying today in my personal capacity and nog as a rePre-
sengative of the American Enterprise Institute. I have served in
the U.S. gdvernment as Deputy Assi.stant Secretary of Treasury for
Developing Nations Finance and as an Assistant Director of the
Wtrite House Council on International Economic Policy.
your letter of lnvitati-on has raised important questions which
are not easy Eo analyze, 1et alone answer. They are difficult to
address not only because they concern interactions among the realms
of security, politics, and economics, but also because it is not
possible Eo analyze the security, political, and economic,inEeractions
between the United States and Western Europe without putting the
analysis r,rithin a multilateral context. In effect, itts like Erying
to play multidimensional chess without knowing the size and shape of
the board a?i. 
";'::hcuI x;.;];n..g tit: nun'ce: ani cllaracteristics of pieces
used in the gaure
In the first part of my testimony, I wil-1 address the broader
questions raised in your letter concerning Ehe relationshi.p between
economic, political, and security matters as they affect U.S.-European
relations i.n connection with the Sovi-et Union and the Middle East,.
Although there are inportant economic interests at stake for Europe
and the United States in connection with the Soviet Union and the
Iliddle East, the dominant issues, and Ehe major sources of di-spuce
in my judgment are political and securiEy in nature. In short, the
resolution of those issues lis5 f,rimarily in the security and political
rea1m, noE the economic.
.. 
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In the second part of my testinony, I will focus more speclfically
on Ehe economic dimension of relations between Ehe United States and
the European nations and identify what I believe to be the central economic
probLeurs and suggest policy directions which may deal with those problems.-
. Part I
Politics-E conomics-and Security
European Relations with the Soviet Union
There has been a tendency in the United States to overestimate
the degree to which changes in economi-c=relations have brought about
changes i.n European political and security attitudes toward -Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Uniort. If anything, it is the other way around:
changes in political and 
.security relations laid the basis for changes
in economic relations. In turn, economic facEors then came i-nto plal'
and worked to slow the growEh in economi.c relatj.ons. My reasons for
these views are briefly suumrarized be1ow.
In the early 1970s, detenEe contributed to the groerth of European
exports to the East not onJrl because detente encouraged European
governments to explore and encourage ways of expanding economic linkages,
but also because detente encouraged private companies to establish economic
ties in order to se11 more goods and encouraged prJ-vate sources of finance
to aggresively lend to the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union. DeEente alLered the sovereign risk assessments of the prj.vate
bankers and 1ed them to increase their exposure to the eastern countries.
As shown i" i"uf. r, reported exports and estinated e):port volume
(i'e', exPorts adjusted for inflation) from the members of the European
Economic cournuni-ty (EEC) to Ehe nations of Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union grew rapidly during the fj-rsr half of the 1970s. Alrhough
not shown in the Table, exports and export volume irom other countries,
including Japan and the unired states, also increased. During the
Jsecond half of the 1970s, nominal exPorts to the EasE continued to
grow, buE the growth reflected inflation. Although a lack of price
data make the esCimates tentative at this stage, export volume declined
from 1975 to 1978, and then increased slightly in 1979. The apparent
lack of growth in export volume during the second half of the decade
in part reflected underlying economic factors including not only poor
economic performance within the Eastern European economies and the
Soviet Union in the second half of ttre iOs, but also a sharply growing
external debt. The latter caused concern noE only among the private
bankers who r.rere lending td the Eastern European countries, but also among
the political leaders of the Eastern European countries and Ehe Soviet Union.
As a result of the export patEerns already cited, it is not
surprising to find that the relative share of total EEC exports
destined for Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union increased during the
first half of the 1970s. Ln other words, at least as measured by
overall export Patternsr.tlade with those countries became more
important to the EEC members during the first half of the 1970s. This
development is shown in Table II for not only the EEC as a whole,
but also for the major EEC members including Germany, France, Italy,
and the United Kingdom. (The relative share of total EEC exPorts
to the East is higher than the shares for individual members since
total EEC exports exclude intra-EEC exPorts, while the exports of
individual members include exports to other EEC members.) Given that
EEC export volume to the East declined during the last half
of the sevenEj.es, it is not surPrising to find that the share
of EEC e>:ports destioed for Eastern Europe and the Soviei Uni-on
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declined afEer L975. It ls interesting to noter as shown in Table 11,
that the relative importance of exports to Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union increased also for Japan and the United StaEes during the first
half of the decade and then remained stable for the united srates
and declined for Japan.
Concerns about the economic dependence of Europe on the Soviet
Union are ofEen raised in the context of natural resources, in parti.cular
oi1 and gas. WiEh respect to oi1, however, European imports of oil from
the Soviet Union have not grown significantly duri-ng the last decade.
SovieE oi1 exports to all of Western Europe rose from .68 nillion barrels
a day ia L972 to 1.0 mi11i6n barrels a'day in 1978, rhe lasE year for
which oi1 export data are currently available. Thus, Soviet oi1 account,ed
for less thaa I percent percent of Western European oi1 consumption in
1978. For 1979, Sovi.et oil exports to Western Europe probably rernained
around the 1978 Level of 1.0 n-i11ion barrel-s a day Ieve1 of 1978.
Approximately 40 percent of Soviet oiI exports to Western Europe
are imported by three countries: France, West Germany, and ltaly. The
other major importer of oil, accounting for 20 percent of Soviet oil
exports Eo l"lestern Europeris Finl-and,. As shown in Table III, in 1979
Soviet oi1 is estinated to have accounted for only 4 percent of France's
oi1 imports, 6 percent of West Gernanyts oi1 imports, and 8 percent of
Italyrs oi1 imports. Looki.ng Eo the future, European dependence on
oil imports from the Soviet Union is likely to decline given that Soviet
production is expected to 1eve1 off, if not decline, over the next five
Eo ten years and gi-ven Soviet oi1 conmitnents to the Eascern European
countries.
sovieE exports of naEural gas to IJestern Europe grew rapidly
during ihe decade of the 70s, but, Soviet naturar gas accounEs for a
5relatively smal} percenEage of European gas consumPtion. As shown in
Table IV, Soviet naEural gas exports Eo l^Iestern Europe rose from a
level of only .04 million barrels a day of oil equivalent to a 1evel
of .32 million barrels a day oi1 equivalent in 1978. In Lg78, Soviet
gas accounted for around 8 percent of total gas consumption in I'lestern
Europe. I estimatc that natural gas exPorEs to tuestern Europe may have
risen to .5 million barrels a day oil equivalent in 1979.
The largest importer of soviet .rat.rral gas, west Germany, imported
in 1978 less Ehan a qua.rter- of a mill-ion barrels a day oi1 equivalent
from the Soviet Union. Thit amounted to* about '25 percent of West
Gernanyrs toEa1 gas consumpti.on in 1978. Natural gas accounts for
17 percent of Germanyts total energy consumption' !
Although trIestern Europets natural gas imports from the Soviet
Union are Iikely to grol, over the next decade, there exisc a nu:'nber of
uncertainties. For example, the Iranian revolution has disrupted
current and'expected gas, eiports from Iran to the SovieE Union. Thus,
fuEure Soviet gas developments which were Eo be dedicated to supplying
Western Europe may ueed to be used to supply those areas of Uhe Soviet
Unj.on which had expected.to rely on Iraniaa gas. In sun, while Soviet
gas exports to Western Europe are ]ikely to grow over the next decade,
Ehe raagnitudes are not 1ike1y to be very significant '
6Your letter of invitaEi-on speclfically asks what economic motivations
may have influenced the European allies t response regarding economic
sanctions against the Soviet Union in response to the Sovj.et Unionts
invasion of Afghanistan. Recognizing that judgments about other countries'
motivations can only be speculative, I would like to make the following
observations.. First, Europeans are in general much more skeptical about
the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a lever to achieve political
ends. Indeed, lhe argument 1s often nade thai such policies have the
opposite political consequences from those desired. Secondly, until if,"
United States develops a_more consistent approach to the use of economic
leverage, we should not f,. 
",rrrrised if foreign governments are reluctant
to fo11ow twist,s and turns in U.S. policy. Although the United StaEes
has traditionally been inclined toward using economic sanctions to achieve
political objectives, the United States has noE developed a consistent
poli.cy regardi-ng the relationship between economic levers and political
objectives. From a European perspectlve, the Unlted States has been
rather 
"rrrii" in its apptication of the linkage concept as it relates to
the Soviets. President Nixon and Henry Kissingerts concept of linkage
was dramatically altered by Ehe Congress and the Jackson-Vanik concept
of linkage, which in turn was modified by Ehe broader human rights approach
of the Carter administration. The Afghanistan invasion triggered the
ad hoc use of sanctions by the U.S. government but there aPParently was
litt1e if any dj-scussion with the Europeans (and other major exporters)
regarding their willingness to participate in the'use of trade sanetions
and more importantly, the type of sanctions that were to be imposed and
the conditions for tightening or loosening theu.
7Final1y, and perhaps more irnportantly, the politieal capit:r1
sPent in persuading reluctant allies to join in the use of economic
sanctions, deEracts from the more fundamental polilical and securi-ty
steps that need to be taken in response to Soviet actions not only
in Afghanistan but also in other parts of the Middle East and in
Africa. Instead of focusing on sanctions, and making the acceprance
of the use of sanctions a major test of political support, the U.S.
government should spend more of an effort to enlist the political
and security assistance 
_of the Europeans, and I mlght add, the Japanese,
in dealing with the more fundamental risks confronting all countries
as they relate to the Soviet Union. This does not preclude the use
of economic pressures, but if economic levers are to be pu11ed, there
ought to be a unified agreernent beforehand regarding which levers and
the conditions under which the levers are to be pul1ed--or released.
8European Relations lJith the Middle East
From an economic perspective, Europe has become significanEly more
lependent on the }liddle East, and in partlcular on the Middle East oil producers--
including lran, Iraq, and the oi1 producers on the Arabian peninsula. Oil'
imports in 1979 from the Middle East oi1 producers accounted for 60 perceni of
total Western European oi1 consumption. Among the major European oi.1
consumers, Middle East oi1 accounted f,or 32 percent of oi1 constrmption
in Germany, 45 percent for the United Kingdon, 88 percent in France,
and 90 percent in Italy. 
_
The Middle East oil producers 
^ 
also have become an important and
growing export market for WesEern Europe. For example, EEC exports to
the Middle East by L976 eJceedea EEC exports to Eastern Europe and
the Soviet Union. By 1978, exports to the Middle East oi1 procucers
amount,ed Eo $22.5 bi11ion, or 10 percent of total EEC exports. As
a result of .a reduction in exports to lran, EEC exports in 1979
declined to$21.5 billion, which amounted to 8 percent of total EEC
exports. (EEC exports to Iran declined from$7.5 billion in 1978 to
$3.1 billion in 1979.) ;Gf.ven the expanded domestic budgets of Ehe
Middle East producers, EEC exports to the Middle East should continue
to grow rapidly in the near future even if exports to Iran do not rise.
The trade data cited above do not include EEC service exports to
the Middle East producers, which also grew significantly afrer 1973.
In addition, Europers financial linkages with the Middle East oi1
producers have expanded. A significant proportion of their
financi.al surpluses have been deposlted in banks located in EEC member
states. The Middle East oil producers also have been making other
investments, including direct as well as financial investments, in
companies in Ehe EEC. Final1y, a number of EEC goverrunents, including
Geruany, have borrowed directly from the oi1 producers of the }Iiddle
9East, in particular Saudi Arabia.
Although Europets economic links to the }tiddle East are broad-
based and growing, a sinr-iIar statement can be made for the united
sEates and Japan. rn addition, the economies of Europe, the unlted 
_
States, and Japan, are linked through each other to the Middle East.
For example, a cut in oil exports from the Middle East to Europe
would have an indirect impact on the United States not only in terms
of its impacE on the inEernati.onal oi1 marketsr but also because
the economic consequences of a cut in oi1 to Europe would affect
European exports and imports from the United States. To a large extent,
cournercial issues or conflicts r,ihich arise ar-nqng the major industria-
lized countries in connection with oi1, trade, capital, and money
can be dealt with in the context of exisEing bilateral and multilateral
relations eqng the major countries.
Looking Eo the next five years, I am less concerned
about unfavorable economic shocks eurinaLing from economic factors
per se. Fop exampl-e, , 9-ornot see an economic basis fsr expecting a significant
reduction in producEion targets amorrg the major oiI producers. Kuwait
and the United Arab Enirates may lower their pre-1979 productioa'targets,
but such a decision on their part would not have a significant impact
on the international oi1 market given that such reductions would pro-
bably not exceed .25 nbd. Iraq continues to expand its domestic deve-
lopment program and thus is 1ike1y to increase iEs production over the
:
next few years. Saudi Arabia will probably return to its production
target of 8.5 million barrels a day, but as long as the Saudis continue
their arnbitious domestic development program, they will not have much
flexibility to lower their long-Eerm production target of B-5 nbd.
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The greatest threats to European and u.s. economic interests,
ho'we'rer, as weli as the eccncnic :nE3i..s;s af nany other countries
including Japan, lie in the political-securi-ty arena. The political
and securi-ty risks include the following. First, should another Arab-
rsraeli war break out, oi1, trade, and financial flows would probably
be disrupted or redirected. Although a settlement per se is not like1y to
have a significant impact on oi1, trade, or financial flows, a settle-
ment would reduce the risk of economic disruptions. seeondly, there
is the risk of revolution or a change in leadership within one of
the major producers. For example, a change in leadership in Saudi Arabia
could result in a sharp reduction in domestic expenditures and provide the
Sovernment more flexibility to reduce its oil production target. A Ehird
source of rlsk relates to the intentions of the Soviet Union: to what
extent does the Soviet Unj.on intend to use its niliEary power Eo gain
access to oi1 in Lhe Mlddle East? A fourth risk is the possibiliry of an
armed conflict among the major producers. For example, a conflict between
Iraq and lrin could cause 6 cut in Iraq's production. A fifth source of
risk is the risk of terrorist acts against the oi1 fields. '
Although these risks exist, the major industrialized countrj-es do
not seem to be making much effort to jointly explore and develop ways in
which the risks cited above could be reduced. As iurportantly, the major
industrialized countries need to explore and develop \"rays in which rhey
will cooperate (beyond oil-sharing agreements) when a crisj.s actually
breaks out. Otherwise, there will be a repeat of ihe conflicts and mi,s-
understandings that have arisen in connection with the rranian.crisis.
1n 5r':m, u's. and European leaders, as well as the leaders of Japan,
need to devote more attenti-on to reduci-ng political-security risks in
the }tiddle East and to develop bioader contingency plans for responding
to rnajor political_security crises.
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Part II
U.S.-European Economic Relations
In the economic realm, one often hears that U.S.-European economic
relations are becoming less imPortant to the Europeans.
Although the relative share of EEC exports destined for the United
States has declined during the last decade--fron 17 percent in 1970
to 13 percent in 1979--it would tu . ,iltake to conclude that the
relaEive importance of 
.U.S.- economic affairs to Europe also has
declined. For one thing, J"tri"", invetinent, and fj-nancial linkages
have grown during Ehat period and the dollar remains the dominant
international currency. Perhaps more importantly, the United States
and European economies interact in a multilateral framework. Thus
economic developments'within either Europe or the United States are
often transmitted to each other through markets in other counEries.
ti
Alrhoulh thc collapselof fixed exchange rates in che early 1970s
1ed many to prematurely declare the death of the postlrar internati.onal
economic system, the fundamentals of that system have survi.ved. Those
fundamentals include a shared belief among the rnajor industrialized
countries and many semi-industrialized and developing countries that
their respective naEional interests would best be served under a market-
oriented, muJ-tilateral international economic system based on the
principles of open markets, nondiscrimination, and reciprociEy. There
also has been a general recogni-tion Ehat beggar-thy-neighbor policies
would unde:mine and ultimately bring down the internaEional system.
Fina11y, there has also been a firm belief in the role of discussion
L2
and negotiation in suitable fora. During the posEwar period, a large
number of countries acted on those beliefs and gradually reduced (a1-
though did not eliminate) restrictions on the flows of goods, services,
capital, and money across national borders. As a consequence, economic
flows among countries grew more rapidly, and national economies became
more closely linked. Because economies have become more interdePendent,
economic policy actions taken in one country are more like1y to have a
greater inpact on econorDic developments in other countries.
With this backgrourrd in mind, I would like to address your-request
for specific policy prescriptions for better managinB the U.S.-I.Jestern
European relationship. In doing so, I will focus initia[y on lwo domestic
areas of U.S. policy which hav-e been at the heart of our economic policy
conflicts with Europe and other nations in recenE years.
In rny judgment, the most serious economic conflicts bet'*'een the
United States and individual countries in Europe, as well as between
the United'S'taEes and orher countries, stem from the U.S. mismanagemenc
of domestic fisca't and monetary policies during the past fifteen years.
First, excessively expansionary fiscal and monetary policies during
xcost of that period generated higher rates of U.S. inflation which in
turn transmitted inflation abroad and undermined the do1lar. Secondly,
sharp swings in U.S. fiscal and, rnonetary policy led to sharp fluctua-
t,ions in U.S. economic activity. Although many observers have cornmented
on the gradual decline in the size of the.U.S. economy relative Eo
the size of other foreign econornies during Ehe post';ar period, shifts
in the U.S. economy sEi11 have a signifj-cant impact on economic activirv
in other countries. Fluctuations in U.S. economic activity noE onlv
.^l-J
influence foreign economic developments through markecs for goods and
services but also through the capital and money markets. Since the
latter are linked through exchange markeEs, shifts in financial flows
have contribuEed to vold.ti1e exchange rates.
The European governments have been critical of the.high and rising
rate of u.s. inflation for more than a decade, but a major poLitical
conflict broke out in 1977 when the Carter adminisEratioo pressured
the German government (and also the Japanese government) to pursue more
expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. Both governments rejected
the pressure because they feared that a more expansionary policy
would trigger domestic inflation and ultimately result in higher rares
of unemplo)ment. Eventually, the rise in domestic u.s. inflation (and
Ehe sharp decline in Ehe do11ar) forced the Carter administration to
shift to a less expansionary policy in late 1978 and again in lare L979.
At the same time, because inflation had been sharply reduced, the
German and Japanese governments were able to fo11ow a more stimulat.ive
policy after mid-1978. fn']addition, Japan and Germany are weathering Ehe
1979 oil- price increases much better than che United States.
During the past few monEhs the dollar has been relatively strong.
However, should it appear to the national- and international financial
markets that the U.S. government j.s turning away from iEs fight against
inflation and providing too uuch stimulus, r have little doubt that
the dollar will again decline sharply. In sum, the future prospects
of the dol1ar, and indirect.ly the future prospects for good U.S.
economic relations not only with the nations of Europe, but also Japan
and the surplus OPEC producers, will depend on whether or not the U.S.
goverruDent can reduce the rate of inflation and return the U.S. economy
1q
to a more stable growEh path. Unless the U.S. e(:c)li.rnv <iocs stabil ize
and ret.urn Eo a 1ow rate of inflation, attempts to amelioraEe the exchange
rate consequences of an unstable doIlar through special faci.lities, for
example the SDR substituLion account proposal, are Iikely to prove futile.
u. s.-European Energy Relations
Since the OPEC revolution of 1973, differences regarding energy
l-,;','e l;rbabi;r been the secc:l'i :ncst sig:rifrcant source of conflict
between Ehe United SEates and the nations of Europe--as well as with
a number of other cou1tri,1s. Again, a fundamental cause of the problems
are domestic u.S. policies. As is well known, the Europeans have been
critical of the failure of the United St,ates to adequately adjust to the
changed situation in the incernational oi1 markets. Given that most of
the European nati.ons had allowed their dorsestic oi1 prices to rise with
the price of international oi1, Europeans have been criti.cal of u.S.
price controls which have maintained U.S. oi1 (and gas) prices below the
1eve1s deteimined by interriational oil prices. The European nations have
believed that at a minimum, the United States should adjust to world
oiI urarket. prices. Since most of the European nations tax oi1 consumption
at very high levels, there lras a strong belief that the United States
should take even rnore vigorous steps to conserve on energy and encourage
productioa. From the European perspective, the greatest opportunities for
oi1 import reduction among the consumer nations existed in the United
SEates since they believed that the United States h.ad considerable "energy
wasEe" thac could be squeezed out of consumption and a considerable energl'
base that could produce Bore.
Although the Europeans were correct in their assessment thaE the
United States vas not doing enough Eo reduce oi1 imports, the Euroneans
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did underestimate the degree t.o which prices had risen and the amount
of adjustment that had in fact taken place within the United SEates.
This misunderstanding exacerbated the bltterness the Europeans felt
toward U.S. economic policies, especi.ally during the period in L977
and 1978. Although there has been a slight decline in U.S. oi1 imports
since L977, and although U.S. oi1 (but not gas) prices are moving
toward the international price Level, and although a variety of measures
have been enacted l9 €ncouraBe conservation and production of energy,
there are a number of domestic steps that could be taken to Promoce
production and conservaLjon within the United States
The future of U.S.-European energ-y relations will depend important,ly
on the ability of the United SEates to reduce U.S. oi1 imports from the
1979 1evel of 8.4 million barrels a day. A further reduction in U.S.
oi1 imports would strengthen the hand of the United States in dealing
with the Europeans, not only on energy issues--for example, in efforts
to persueCe other cauri:1es io i;pcse o11 in;or: targel:s in t*h': f:rt:l:e--
but also w6u1d have a favorable effect on overall U.S. economic relations
with the European naEions
There is an international energy issue which f wouta Like to briefly
address. A consensus appears to be developing for another producer-
consumer dialogue. The official text of the DeclaraEion of the Venice
Sumnit stat,es Ehat "We would welcome a const,ructive dialogue on energy
and related issues between energy producers and consumers in order to
i-uprove the coherence of these polieies." Having Feen invoived in
the CIEC negotiations, I am skeptical about the usefulness of g1oba1
negoEiations of that sort. If anythi:lg, there are polit.ical cosEs since
such negotiations provide a stage for posturing on Ehe part of govern-
mencs which ofEen take one position in public and anot.her in Drivate.
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The Unlted States should not enter such negotiaEions unless two conditions
are met. First, deLailed groundwork should be lald with other governments
regarding the subjecEs to be negotiated and the possible outcomes of the
negotiati.ons. Secondly, the U.S. governmenc should have a clear-cut
idea of what it is willing to give--and demand ir, 
",.,"tlr,egotiations.
With respect to the U.S. positions to be taken, the U.S. Executive Branch
and the Congress should work closely before and during such negotiations in ways 
-
similar to the planning and cooperation that exj-sts during major trade negotiations.
U.S.-European Trade RelaEions
The conpletion of ttle Tokyo Round of trade negotiations was a major
accompLishment of the Carter administration in Ehe context of its economic
relations with other countri.es. The Carter administration.has also been
reasonably successful in contai-ning domesti.c proEectionist pressures.
Looking out over the near term, and given the recession in the United
States as well as the sLowdor"rn in economic growth in other countries,
protectionist pressures are going to intensify. During the next two
-.+:
years, trade conflicts are likely to become the primary source of economic
conflict between the united SEaEes and other governmenEs,
including but certainly not limited to nations of Europe. Thus, r
believe that the uost significant statenent in the Venice Declarati.on
was the shortest: "we are resol-ved further to strengthen the open
world trading system. I^Ie will resist pressures for protecEionist
actions, which can only be self-defeating and aggravate inflation."
International Finance
Another subject which is likely to requi-re greater atEengion fron
European and u.S. leaders, again in a murtilaterar context, involves
L7
the recycllng of the OPEC surpluses. kmnedlatqly following the oi1 price
increases of. L973, there ,"t" f"tucasts thaE the OPEC surpluses would
remain large and pose a threat to the international financial system.
The international financj.at system, including noE only private banks
but also official institutions proved to be more resilient
and adaptive than many had thought possible. In addition, by 1978
the OPEC surpluses had disappeared. Commercial financial insti-
tutions, however, continued to play an important role in channeling
money from other surplus countries to deficit countries.
The recent rise in oil prices has once again gencraEed uncertainEy
about the ability of the private financial system to recycle the OPEC
surpluses. Although history rnay repeat itself, there are many who today
forecast that the OPEC surpluses will be remain large through the
decade of the 1980s. In addition, many of those r.rho were optimistic
at the stage of Ehe cycle following the 1973-74 price increases are today
much more pissimistic about, the abillty of the international financial
systeE to recycle thj-s round of OPEC surpluscs'
This is a subject requiring cxtensive aealysis in and of itsclf,
but I would like to couurent on what I consider to be Ehe central policy
issues. These issues involve those industrialized countries whose
banks perform international financiaL intermediaEion services and the
surplus oPEC countries. One issue concerns vhether official insEitutions,
including the l,lc:l:l la:h :: r.;;ll.L .s the II[. should pl-av a significantly
greater role in the recycling of the oi1 surpluses. Since a signifi-
18
canEly larger role for these instltutions would probably require
approprlations on the part of the U.S. Congress to underwrite the risks
connected with suCh an increase, (which I doubt the-Congress would be
willing Eo support at this stage,) and since a significantly larger
role for official financing would embroil those institutions in the
political choices that have to be made with respect to which deficit
countries should receive the recycled OPEC surplus, I believe it
would be a mistake at this time to significantly expand the roles of
the offlcirl institutions. Instead, the United States, the major
European governmenEs, ar[{ the governments of Japan and the major OPEC
surplus countries, should have contingency plans to enable them to
quickly respond if the commercial banking inilustry encounters serious
problems, such as the possibili.Ey of a major country default. There
are many different kinds of risks confronting the international
finaneial system today, and it is difficult Eo assess at this time
which, if any, of those risks might produCe an actual financial crisis.
ri
However, if a crisis develops, it is likely Eo emerge very rapidly.
Thus, the major countries need to be prepared to respond quickly.
Otherwise, an intero"aion'"f financial crisis could have serious rePer-
cussions on a large number of deficit countries and result in a whole-
sale contraction of world econouic activity.
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Table IIl
M.A"IOR EUROPEAN ECONOMIES
OIL I}PORTS
7979
West Germany France
oi1
Import,s
mbd
1.18
.23
.L2
.32
.30
2.t5
Z of Total
Oi1 Imports
14
Z of TotaL
Oi1 lmports
Italy
0i1 % of Tocal
Imports Oi1 lmports
mbd
oi1
Imports
nbd
OAPEC
Iran
USSR
Other OPEC
OEher
Total lmporEs
55
1L
6
15
t.92
.L2
.10
.23
.15
, (,
76 L.7 6
..04
,L7
.r0
.L7
a al.
79
2
a
4
8
5
4
9
6
Source: National loreign Assessment Center and authorrs estimaEes
t"
Total Exports
To Eastern Europe
To I,Jestern Europe
I'rance
Italy
West Gernany
Table IV
USSR NATURAL CAS
mbd equivalent
r97 4
.25
.14
.09
L973
.L2
.09
.04
t97 5 L976
.45
,1
.23
.02
.07
.07
L977
.57
.30
.27
.04
.09
.09
1978
.64
.32
tgTge
.93
.43
.50
34
20
L4
04
05
.02
.04
.,.
.04
.09
.12
e = estimated
Source: national Foreign Assessment Center
